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Who Does and Who Doesn’t: The Impetus for Terrorist Organization Involvement with 
Drug Trafficking Organizations 
Introduction 
 Since the 1960s to the present, international government officials have been linking drug 
trafficking with terrorism.  When studying the connection between drug trafficking and 
terrorism, many scholars study Latin America, as it is a well known region that participates in the 
drug trade and has many insurgent groups as a result of a generally weak political history. 
 There are many different theories that attempt to explain the connection between drug 
trafficking organizations and terrorist organizations.  Some theorists argue that these 
organizations will create connections based on their ideology, while others argue that these 
groups will interact out of convenience.  Additionally, there are theorists that believe there 
should be no connection between the two at all.  This paper evaluates the theories based on a 
case study of two Colombian terrorist organizations.   
Theory 
 Many scholars argue that theoretically there should be no connection between drug 
trafficking and terrorism because the two have differing goals.  While those who participate in 
the drug trade would rather attract less attention from the government, terrorist organizations 
seek public recognition for their actions.  According to Cilluffo, however, “[d]espite this, the 
links between organized crime and terrorism are becoming stronger in regards to the drug trade” 
(Cilluffo 2000: 1).  In this mutually beneficial relationship, groups that participate in organized 
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crime run the trafficking part of the operation, while the terrorist organizations control the land 
where the drugs are cultivated.  Ultimately, this allows both groups to achieve their respective 
goals; however, although many groups use drug trafficking for financial support, there are many 
groups that do not.   
One linkage theory states that drug trafficking organizations and terrorist organizations 
are linked due to greed and self-interest.  The link between the two has little or nothing to do 
with political agendas.  From looking at the general goals of terrorist organizations, scholars 
argue that they seek to transform society in order to overthrow governments.  Drug trafficking 
organizations on the other hand, “…seek to be immunized from government intervention so they 
can go about their business” (Damask and Miller 1996: 124).  Lee argues that the two groups are 
able to come together because they share a common enemy in the form of the government.  
While the government interferes with the drug trafficking organization‟s attempts to participate 
in organized crime, it also interferes with the attempts of the terrorist organization‟s to 
implement a new government policy.  The other side of this argument, however, shows that there 
are times in which the drug trafficking organization will participate within the established power 
system, thus providing no support for the terrorist organization.  Differences like this have the 
potential to create clashes in countries in which the government is being funded by drug 
trafficking organizations (Damask and Miller 1996: 124-125). 
According to Damask and Miller, the relationship between drug traffickers and terrorist 
organizations is a myth that is supported by North American policy interests.  He argues that the 
presidential administrations of both Reagan and George H. W. Bush used the connections 
between the two in order to help move forward their political agendas.  Damask and Miller argue 
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that the link of drug trafficking and terrorism is both tangential and ephemeral.  Norco-terrorism 
is ultimately a myth, as drug trafficking and terrorism do not intersect and when they do, the 
relationship is short-lived and superficial (Damask and Miller 1996: 114). 
 During the 1980s, two professors stated that drug trafficking and terrorism were linked 
because they both shared the common goal of undermining the West.  By using the Soviet Union 
as a case study, they determined that this theory was not so farfetched, as Soviet terrorist 
organizations were mainly communist and had connections with drug trafficking organizations 
that could be used as a weapon to attack the Western ideology in the form of the United States.  
Ehrenfeld argues that Marxist and Leninist regimes developed drug trafficking solely as a 
weapon to take down the West (Damask and Miller 1996: 115).  While this theory addresses a 
possible reason for the interaction between communist terrorist organizations and drug 
trafficking organizations, it fails to account for those drug trafficking organizations that are not 
anti-American in nature.  Those who support the idea of narco-terrorism as a global communist 
conspiracy argue that the relationship between the terrorists and drug trafficking organizations is 
based on communist ideology.   In addition to the Soviet Union, Ehrenfeld uses the Cuban 
example of the Guillot-Lara Episode in order to support her thesis that drug trafficking and 
terrorism are linked through common ideology.  A closer look at the event, however shows that 
drug trafficking and terrorism worked hand in hand in this particular case because linking the 
two would prove beneficial to all parties involved in the transactions.  Ehrenfeld assumes that 
involvement of some communist Cuban officials means there is an involvement of the Cuban 
government.  In other words, smaller parts of the government were seen to represent the 
government as a whole (Damask and Miller 1996: 117-118).  
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 Wardlaw argues that there are many different ways in which drug trafficking 
organizations can be linked, and each linkage must be looked at on a case by case basis in order 
to appropriately address the situation.  To Wardlaw, the term narco-terrorism implies that there 
are defined characteristics and potentially one general way to fight this type of terrorism.  
Wardlaw believes that one needs to define narco-terrorism in order to be able to determine the 
nature of its presence in the international arena.  While it is easier to define what constitutes 
international drug trafficking, political officials often disagree over a definition for terrorism.  
For his research, Wardlaw uses a definition that emphasizes that the group must seek to 
“…create extreme anxiety and/or fear-inducing effects in a target group large than the immediate 
victims with the purpose of coercing that group onto acceding to the political demands of the 
perpetrators” (Wardlaw 1988: 7).  Although he can produce a working definition for narco-
terrorism, he still believes that the term should not be used to describe the connection between 
drug trafficking organizations and terrorist organizations. 
 Wardlaw argues that narco-terrorism does not exist as a general type of terrorism because 
in each case, the link between drug trafficking organizations and terrorist organizations is 
different.  There is no general requirement of what constitutes a connection between the two.  
Labeling the connections between the two groups under the heading of narco-terrorism leads to 
the false belief that most, if not all, instances in which the groups interact are more or less the 
same.  Drug trafficking and terrorism remain in two separate spheres because drug trafficking is 
not terrorism.  Members of drug trafficking organizations do not commit violence to instill fear.  
Expanding the definition of terrorism to include drug trafficking is problematic because it helps 
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to make the definition of terrorism so broad that it includes certain events, such as wars, that 
would not necessarily be categorized as such (Wardlaw 1988: 11-12). 
Literature Review 
 Terrorist organizations can be funded either through the state or through private funding.  
State funding has been generally decreasing, while private funding, either legitimate or unlawful, 
has been increasing.  Legitimate funding includes donations from those who make their money 
by legal means, monies from charities, and various methods of fundraising.  According to 
Bantekas, state funding incorporates others means besides direct monetary funding.  While the 
state may not produce hard cash for these organizations, their actions and decisions have the 
potential to influence the execution of terrorist acts and benefit the organization.  When the state 
produces any sort of funding for a terrorist organization, it assumes responsibility for the actions 
of the organization (Bantekas 2003: 316-317).  International law enforcement can more easily 
attack state funded terrorist organizations that they can non-state funded terrorist organizations.       
 Unlawful funding includes drug trafficking, money laundering, smuggling, and illegal 
arms trade.  These types of funding are considered unlawful by either national or international 
definitions (Bantekas 2003: 316).  Examining the link between terrorism with organized crime 
such as drug trafficking, money laundering, smuggling and illegal arms trade forces politicians to 
realize that terrorism and organized crime are not one in the same.  Terrorism is unique in that 
terrorist organizations always have an ideological motivation while organized crime does not. 
Organized crime‟s main motivation is making money.  Although terrorist organizations become 
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involved with groups that participate in illegal activities, they do not forfeit their ideological 
aspirations.   
According to Steinitz, when exploring why terrorist organizations began interacting with 
drug trafficking organizations, scholars first looked to Colombia, as it was a prominent source of 
marijuana.  The 19
th
 of April Movement began to take advantage of the traffickers they saw 
becoming wealthy.  They began interacting with members of the drug cartel by kidnapping 
family members of known members of the Medellin Cartel.  Members of the 19
th
 of April 
Movement also collaborated with Colombian traffickers by allowing drug traffickers to deliver 
weapons while members of the terrorist organization protected shipments of drugs.  Through this 
mutually beneficial relationship, drug cartels pushed to provide terrorist organization members 
with “…resources, money and haven (Steinitz 2002: 3).   
 Steinitz also gives another example of how terrorist organizations utilized drug traffickers 
through the example of Sendero Luminoso.  Peru, the base country of operation for Sendero 
Luminoso, became involved in the drug trade because the country was the leading producer of 
the coca leaf, an instrumental ingredient to the production of cocaine.  Coca farmers, known as 
cocaleros had close ties with members of Sendero Luminoso because these farmers operated in 
the same territory in which the terrorist organization was founded.  Out of the two terrorist 
organizations that operated within Peru, drug traffickers sought protection from whichever group 
was strongest in the area in which they were working.  Members of Sendero Luminoso justified a 
relationship with drug traffickers because of the previous relationship of the terrorist 
organization with the cocaleros of the area, in addition to ability of the drug trade to weaken the 
power of the United States.  Through analysis of the level of sophistication of the fire arms of the 
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organization, Steinitz derives that Sendero Luminoso used the money gained from involvement 
with drug traffickers in order to pay the salaries of the members of the organization (Steinitz 
2002: 5-6).       
 Terrorist organizations serve to benefit from a connection with drug trade organizations 
because it allows them to have a non-state sponsored financial source.  Depending on state 
sponsored support often allows to the state to impose limitations on the actions of the terrorist 
organization. Additionally, this separation from the states poses other advantage for terrorist 
organizations, as other international military powers, such as the United States can no longer 
target states to attempt to control the behaviors of terrorist organizations (Cilluffo 2000: 2).  
Since non-state sponsored funding allows terrorist organizations more freedom to do as they 
choose, the United States must now implement different policies to handle the threats that are 
posed by terrorist organizations. 
 During the late 1980s and early 1990s, countries like Colombia and Mexico did feel the 
need to take steps to combat narcoterrorism within their state borders. Within Colombia, former 
President Virgilio Barco Vargas declared war against criminal drug trafficking organizations and 
cartels that operated within his country borders after presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galan 
was assassinated by members of the notorious Medellin Cartel.  While the Colombian 
government had been taking steps to combat this important issue, Galan‟s assassination pushed 
the government to do more towards these efforts (Bagley and Tokatlian 1990: 9).   
After the drug barons of the Medellin Cartel responded to President Barco‟s declaration 
of war, they proceeded by targeting different groups.  During stage one the cartel pursued a 
locally concentrated campaign of violence in and around the city of Medellin, subsequently 
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prompting members of the Department of Antioquia to declare that the government needed to 
alter tactics and have a dialogue with the cartel.  During the second stage of their campaign, the 
cartel brought their violent attacks to other large cities in an attempt to show they would upset 
daily life within the whole country.  Killing over 200 people, the drug barons convinced many 
other politicians that dialogue with the cartel would be preferable over any degree of violent 
confrontation.  In the third and fourth stages, the Medellin Cartel politicized their campaign 
through bribery and attacked the traditional Colombian oligarchy.  As a result of the 
politicization of the violent campaign, Congress proposed a national referendum concerning the 
constitutional reform and the extradition of criminals.  Feeling that Congress was being 
intimidated by the actions of the cartel, President Barco threw out all proposed constitutional 
reforms to block the amendment process.  Additionally, in response to the actions of the cartel 
prominent families agreed to negotiations that would lessen punishment of the drug barons if 
they agreed to free hostages and stop their terrorist campaign.  Barco ultimately did not agree 
with these negotiations, and subsequently ordered the extradition of another Colombian drug 
trafficker (Bagley and Tokatlian 1990: 10-11) 
Within Colombia, a group that has posed a large threat to the state has been the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, otherwise known as FARC.  For many years, the 
terrorist organization had taxed drug traffickers within the country, but later became more deeply 
involved in the workings of the operations.  They have become “….the middlemen between the 
farmers and the cocaine processing labs owned by the cartel bosses” (Cilluffo 2000: 4).  Because 
of this link, as revenue from drug trafficking increases, the influence and power of FARC has 
increased as well.  A major concern of Colombian officials is the large amount of territory 
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controlled by FARC.  FARC has used this territory to continue drug cultivation with less 
involvement from the Colombian government. 
Another country that has experienced a growing problem with the connection of drug 
trafficking and terrorism is Mexico.  Within Mexico, drug trafficking started to become 
prominent around 1914 with the prohibition of opium, opiates, and cocaine within the United 
States.  In 1991, for the first time the Mexican government adopted a political position arguing 
that drug trafficking was a threat to national security.  The country paid greater attention to the 
situation after the terrorist attacks of September 11
th
 2001 (Calvani 2006: 139, 142-143).       
Prior to the September 11
th 
attacks on the World Trade Center, there was diminished 
international support for fighting terrorism within Latin America and other regions.  Political 
officials believed that after the fall of the Soviet Union, the transition to democracy within Latin 
America would create governments that would be well equipped to fight terrorism within their 
countries; however, the governments of Latin American countries have historically rooted 
problems that strongly affect their abilities to control the issue of terrorist organizations that 
interact with drug trafficking organizations (Cilluffo 2000: 6). 
According to Pardo, Colombia is an international security threat for two major reasons: 
drugs and control of the country.  The drug threat within the country stems from the decisions of 
individuals to use traditional Andean coca and form an international drug business.  By the mid 
1970s, this group of individuals controlled nearly 70 percent of the world‟s marijuana supply and 
decided that the sale of cocaine could be lucrative as well.  After seeing the effects of increased 
drug trafficking activity within Colombia, government officials attempted to control the 
traffickers; however the government was too weak to handle such a problem.  While the country 
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does not lack laws, it is unable to efficiently put these laws into practice to create order within 
the country (Pardo 2000: 66-67). 
According to Juan Carlos Calleros, the transition to democracy within Latin America 
remains unfinished, and until these countries find a solution to the holes within their democratic 
systems, Latin America will continue to experience many of the issues they have had since their 
first decisions to move towards democratization.  Calleros‟ theory supposes that the main reason 
Latin America has not achieved consolidated democracy is because of the lack of the rule of law.  
Rule of law is defined as “[the] constitutional limits on the kind of powers that governments may 
legitimately exercise, as well as on the extent of those governmental powers” (Calleros 2009: 1).  
Rule of law emphasizes the power of the government to impose limits on the actions of 
individuals or groups who do not follow the laws laid out for the state.   
Rule of law is a Platonic and Aristotelian idea that presupposes that people prefer being 
governed by law as opposed to being governed by man, as law is developed through reason.  
This concept emphasizes that laws should be known to the public, they should be open and clear, 
they should not be allowed to be altered to suit the needs of the judiciary or crime prevention 
agencies, and the judiciary should remain independent from all other branches of government.  
Some schools of thought believe that difficult cases can be determined by fresh legislation 
produced by judges.  This problem however is combated through the existence of multiple courts 
within the larger judicial system.  When an unsatisfactory or seemingly unconstitutional decision 
is handed down from a lower court, the public has the option of attempting to get the decision 
appealed to a higher court (Calleros 2009: 20-21). 
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According to Calleros, within Latin America, the judiciary problems generally negatively 
impact the underprivileged and the poor, while “…corruption practices and political networks 
provide some sort of legal privileges for the benefit of the rich and the influential (Calleros 2009: 
32).  Coupled with an understanding of the link between terrorism and drug trafficking, one can 
see how the lack of rule of law within Latin America is problematic and increases the likelihood 
of political violence.  It affords little to no benefit the poorer classes in the region, leading some 
members of these lower social classes to achieve survival and push for change through illegal 
means.  According to Guillermo O‟Donnell, the elected government has the responsibility of 
carrying out its policies through democratic means and institutions that have a system of checks 
and balances (Calleros 2009: 35).   
O‟Donnell argues that both vertical accountability and horizontal accountability are 
important to the development of democracy.  Free and fair elections, freedom of speech, freedom 
of the press, and freedom of association all provide means for vertical accountability, as these 
put political officials in the center of the political process.  Citizens have the ability to lobby 
public officials in order to get them to meet their social demands.  Officials are held responsible 
for their actions; however, the strength of vertical accountability is hard to measure because 
elections are held only periodically, and there are many aspects of democracy, such as political 
parties that complicate the situation even more.  Horizontal accountability helps to measure how 
liberal or republican democracies are.  Horizontal accountability is built on the idea that there are 
certain rights that cannot be violated by anyone including the state (O‟Donnell 1998: 112-113). 
Within Latin America, officials are not generally held responsible for their actions.  
Unaccountable power is generally concentrated in the hands of the Executive branch.  For 
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instance, members of the Executive branch, often deviate from their proposed political platforms 
that helped place them into office.  Additionally, there are also times when there are institutional, 
illegal, informal, or unconstitutional violations by the elected government that interfere with 
democracy working properly within a country.  There are no particular checks and balances that 
restrict each branch of government from encroaching on the responsibilities of other branches of 
government (Calleros 2009: 35-36). 
The judicial branches of many Latin American countries are weak and incapable of 
administering justice.  They have historically been built on “…networks of patron-client 
relations, as well as rooted habits, expectations of impunity for government officials, and a 
predatory rent seeking attitude toward public office” (Calleros 2009: 39).  Latin American 
political systems have historically been subjected to military influence.  Because of this, 
governments have often made pacts with military officials that result in these officials not being 
punished for past human rights violations.  Judicial branches are also often inefficient and 
inaccessible to many members of society.  They are inefficient due to insufficient funding, 
unqualified personnel, outdated laws and procedures, lack of appropriate equipment, and lack of 
organization.  They are considered inaccessible to many members of society because the system 
is biased towards the underprivileged and the poor.  Laws are applied in a discriminatory manner 
as officials are inconsistent with their rulings concerning members of the underprivileged and 
lowers classes.  There are more court systems in urban areas rather than rural areas, affording 
members of the middle and upper class better access to court systems and legal assistance.  
Additionally middle and upper class citizens have better knowledge of their rights and 
responsibilities under the law which provides a disadvantage for underprivileged and lower class 
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citizens.  Laws in Latin American countries are ultimately perverted in favor of the higher 
classes of society (Calleros 2009: 38-41, 43-44).  While some of these people may include 
prominent members of the drug trade, other people who participate in drug trafficking and 
terrorism within Latin America are a part of the lower classes.  They are products of a system 
that has failed them and are looking for ways to assist themselves financially and influence 
changes to the system.  
From an examination of the deficiencies within many Latin American government 
systems, it is evident that there are economic disparities within these countries.  More often than 
not, economic disparities among social classes cause discontent among those who are closer to 
the base of the social pyramid.   
Investigation 
This paper seeks to discover why some terrorist organizations choose to use drug 
trafficking while others do not.  Through and in depth analysis of the evolution of the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the People‟s Revolutionary Army this paper will 
highlight the differences in the development of both groups, distinguishing those traits that have 
helped them make their decisions on pursuing or not pursuing  involvement with drug trafficking 
organizations.  While the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia has been heavily supported 
by the financial aid of drug trafficking organizations, the People‟s Revolutionary Army has been 
turning to other less lucrative illegal means of financial support.  I will show that although these 
groups are both rooted within Colombia, the opportunities available because of geographic 
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location, as well as circumstances of development have ultimately influenced their decisions to 
use or not use drug trafficking as a form of financial support. 
Colombia 
      Like many other countries in the South American region, Colombia has a history of 
Spanish colonization.  This history has helped to influence the development of paramilitary 
organizations within the country.  According to Skidmore, Smith, and Greene, geography played 
an important role in the development of Colombia.  Because of its geographical location, 
Colombia is divided into three major regions.  These regions are the East Coast, the West Coast, 
and the Caribbean coast.  In pre-colonial Colombia, political power developed in the East, while 
the Caribbean coast developed commerce and gold mining developed in the West.  Because of 
the region‟s geographic disunity, the Spaniards arrived and colonized the country unevenly 
creating distinct cultural and racial profiles.  The Caribbean and West Coast experienced a 
decline in indigenous populations, while the East Coast maintained a large portion of its 
indigenous population (Skidmore et al. 2010: 191-193).   
 During the early 19
th
 century, creoles within Colombia began to push for independence 
after the 1808 invasion of the Iberian Peninsula by Napoleon.  Within Colombia, the creoles felt 
that the Spanish monarchy should not be restored.  Lower classes became involved adding a 
social class element to the liberation struggle. Social changes, freeing Afro-Colombian slaves 
and creating greater social mobility, came as a result of the Wars of Independence.  Colombia 
gained its independence from Spain in 1819 (Skidmore et al 2010: 194). 
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 This moment in Colombian history is important as it began the political violence between 
the more liberal components of society and the more conservative components of society.  This 
violence has lead to disagreement over development of public policy, as well as the 
implementation of public policy.  Terrorist organizations have grown from these political 
schisms, viewing their use of force as necessary to help affect political change. 
 Upon gaining independence, Colombia began working on forming political parties in 
order to build its government. In the early 1900s, Colombia experienced a wave of violence and 
conflict over land reform.  The Conservatives, consisting of landowners, the Catholic Church, 
and peasants under its control, disagreed with the Liberals, consisting of a large population of 
peasants.  The Conservative Party was internally split and weakened by the Great Depression, 
allowing the Liberals to take control of government policies (Skidmore et al. 2010: 204).  During 
the time period from 1930 to 1946, the Liberals initiated land reform within the country.   This 
land reform “…restricted ancestral privileges and unleashed furious political opposition from the 
Conservatives” (Molano 2000: 1).  The land reforms initiated by President Olaya allowed all 
uncultivated land to be transferred over to the state allowing public lands to be owned only by 
the individuals who were working on them (Skidmore et al. 2010: 204). 
In the mid-1900s, Jorge Eliecer Gaitan became the center of a mass movement to help 
push for laws that would help the disadvantaged sectors of society.  Gaitan‟s movement attacked 
the Conservatives and oligarchic rule while empowering the lower classes that were generally 
disregarded in the policymaking process.  While Gaitan embodied many of the Liberal 
arguments, he also represented a threat to the leaders of his own party.  Through utilizing his 
talents as a powerful speaker, Gaitan had the ability to mobilize the masses.  His movement did 
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not create systemic support, or support of the leaders of the Liberal party.  Those who chose to 
follow the ideals of Gaitan remained loyal to him, which did not necessarily benefit the Liberal 
party as a whole.  His assassination in 1948 caused even more turmoil and disagreement within 
Colombia, as it brought the period of Convivencia to an end.  This new era from 1946-1964 was 
known as La Violencia.  During this time, Liberals protested Conservative rule and sought to 
push for economic gain for the lower classes of society.  La Violencia was brought to an end by 
Laureano Gomez who offered amnesty to the guerillas that had been involved in the rampant 
violence of the prior years.  When Colombia experienced an economic crisis in 1956, Liberals 
and Conservatives came together in order to remove Rojas from power (Skidmore et al. 2010: 
205-208).  This led to the development of the National Front. 
After many uneventful attempts at transitioning to democracy, Colombia developed the 
idea of the National Front which would create a formal pact between the majorities of the Liberal 
and Conservative parties.  Through this agreement, the Liberals and Conservatives would 
alternate control of the presidency while positions in the all three governmental branches would 
be distributed evenly among members of both the Liberal and Conservative parties.  The main 
goals of the National Front were to end the great amount of political violence within the country, 
to restore constitutional democracy and civility within Colombia, and to ensure that members of 
both political sides had access to power within Colombian government.  While this arrangement 
helped to quell partisan fighting, it created different forms of anti-system violence and 
disagreement of social policy.  Due to a prominent population of peasants within Colombia, 
agrarian reform was an important issue.  Conflict over agrarian reform and political ideology 
helped lead to the development of two organizations: The National Liberation Army and the 
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Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.  While the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
has grown into a larger, more powerful force, the National Liberation Army has split.  In 
addition to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, this paper focuses of the People‟s 
Revolutionary Army, one of the groups formed from the split of the National Liberation Army. 
While the People‟s Revolutionary Army focused mainly on who was ultimately making the 
decisions within the Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia emerged with a 
greater emphasis on conflict over agrarian reform (Skidmore et al. 2010: 194, 209). 
Case Study: People’s Revolutionary Army of Colombia (ERP) 
In order to understand why the People‟s Revolutionary Army of Colombia did not turn to 
drug trafficking organizations for financial support, it is imperative to understand the history of 
the National Liberation Army, as the ERP is a splinter group of this larger organization. In 1962, 
university students formed the National Liberation Army (ELN), which was opposed to the elites 
making all political decisions within the country.  The National Liberation Army was inspired by 
Che Guevara, and was led by Fabio Vasquez Castano (Garcia 1). The National Liberation Army 
is the second most well known guerilla group within Colombia. 
The National Liberation Army is primarily based in Colombia, with other bases operating 
in the borderlands near Venezuela.  According to Jane‟s Information Group, the ELN has wanted 
to establish a socialist government within Colombia by attacking both the state as well as 
economic targets.  The group targets “…infrastructure, including power lines, bridges and dams, 
[and] roads and oil pipelines” (Jane‟s 2011).  During the late 80s and early 90s, in addition to 
physically attacking these targets, the group used kidnapping and extortion to gain profit to 
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support their operations believing that drug trafficking was not a viable option for financial 
support as it had the potential to destroy Colombia (Gomez 2009). 
The People‟s Revolutionary Army was formed because of the internal power struggles 
and disorganization of the leadership of the National Liberation Army.  While the People‟s 
Revolutionary Army is a splinter organization, it does share the same communist/socialist 
ideology of its parent organization.  This group followed in the footsteps of its parent 
organization and used kidnapping and extortion as a means of obtaining financial support (GTD).  
Founded in the early 90s, the movement of the People‟s Revolutionary Army was short lived due 
to weakness caused by a lack of support.  The group surrendered to the Colombian government 
on September 15, 2007.  The ERP was weakened through pressure of the Colombian army.  
They were isolated and cut off from provisions.  This was a factor that helped them decide to 
demobilize (Colombia Estereo). 
This group‟s major motivations for not seeking out financial aid from drug trafficking 
organizations are clear.  While it may have been economically beneficial to do so, the group 
adhered to the ideological followings of its parent organization.  They were also located in a 
geographical area that would not allow them to interact with drug trafficking organizations.  
Lastly, because the group was a faction of the larger National Liberation Army, it competed for 
followers.  The group‟s demobilization in 2007 shows that it was unable to compete and gain 
substantial support.  Unlike the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the People‟s 
Revolutionary Army was not provided with the opportunities and circumstances to be able to 
become involved with drug trafficking organizations.                   
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Case Study: The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
During the 1940s, the Liberals became internally divided, allowing the Conservatives to 
take control of the Colombian government.  They pushed to regain land lost because of the 
Liberal reforms.  The Conservative government of Colombia gave weapons to peasants who 
supported the Conservative cause, while Liberal peasants took up arms against the government.  
These peasants on the eastern plains were supported by the Liberal Party as well as Communist 
Party activists.  They banded together in order to form multiple small guerilla groups throughout 
Colombia.   In the late 1950s, these guerilla groups had retreated to the jungles of the Andean 
foothills.  This group, known as the Independent Republics, organized based on the principles of 
economic self-management and military self defense.  Liberals in the group later withdrew 
support and were silenced by the government, as it believed the Communist ideals of this group 
was disturbing public order within Colombia.  In 1964 the Colombian army attacked the 
Independent Republics; however the area inhabited by these guerilla fighters had been 
abandoned and the small number of the members remaining in the area sought refuge in 
neighboring mountains.  (Molano 2000: 1).  This small group later became known as the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.    
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, otherwise known as FARC was 
established as the military wing of the Colombian Communist Party in 1964 (Global Security 1).  
According to Skidmore et al, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia had its roots in the 
agrarian movements during the 1920s (Skidmore et al. 2010: 210).  This history has greatly 
influenced the evolution of the group and its level of strength within Colombia.  Today FARC is 
known as the most powerful Communist Colombian guerilla group. 
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  According to Molano, the members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia felt 
that they could not affect change within Colombia through legal means.  They turned to armed 
rebellion.  The National Front, still in effect during the 1970s still pushed for agrarian reform.  
Between the years of 1970 and 1974, the government initiated a rural development plan that 
would hurt the business of small-scale peasant producers and urge peasants to move towards the 
industrial work force.  In response, peasants invaded large areas of land.  Both government and 
private groups used violence against the peasants in order to regain their land. (Molano 2000: 2-
3). 
    With the increased violence against peasants many more individuals chose to join 
FARC‟s movement.  During this time, the group focused on increasing its influence, opening 
new areas and training military leaders.  The group grew from 500 to approximately 3000 people 
and became more structured with a training school, political program, and top down military 
structure (Molano 2000: 3).  Living as displaced peasants, they sought to survive by any means 
necessary.  
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia has had a mixed history of both armed 
conflict and peace negotiations with the Colombian government.  In the early 1980s, the 
government made motions to legalize the political activity of the organization, converting their 
military force into a political party.  With this initiative, the Patriotic Union was developed as a 
political wing of FARC.  Subsequent presidents, like Virgilio Barco offered them political and 
civil participation in exchange for them ceasing the violence.  The group however, did not 
comply with the requirements of the state, and violence was once again initiated.  In the early 
1990s, attempts at peace were made again requiring the guerillas to be confined to a specific 
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geographical location and to suspend all kidnappings, extortions and bombings.  This 
intervention for peace failed, as FARC refused to remain in one geographical location.  The 
group‟s inability to be confined to one area had thus far been their strongest and most effective 
weapon (Molano 2000: 4-5).   
With many of the peace talks that moved through the 80s and 90s, the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia persuaded the Colombian government to create a demilitarized zone 
in order to proceed with negotiations (Ortiz 2002: 135).  This action shows that FARC did have 
some pull in the government through their ability to receive concessions from political officials.  
This type of strength is atypical of guerilla groups (Ortiz 2002: 136).  They used this tactic to 
have the state demilitarize a large portion of Colombia, thus giving FARC control over larger 
areas of territory. 
Since the end of the Cold War, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia has had the 
ability to be able to be independent from any foreign state.  While the group developed in poorer 
areas of Colombia, it has taken advantage of the benefits of involvement with drug trafficking 
organizations.  They have used their strategy skills to provide “…peasants and dealers involved 
in the business basic services such as justice, maintenance of public order, and defense against 
the operations of the army and the police (Ortiz 2002: 137).  Through negotiating with the 
organizations and providing protection, FARC makes money to support their political cause.  
Additionally, other members of peasant society who grow drugs move to support the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia because they are involved with drug trafficking 
organizations.  This added support also helps to make the movement bigger and stronger. 
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The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia was formed outside of an organizational 
structure.  While the National Liberation Army was formed by university students within an 
institution, FARC was formed by angry, displaced peasants.  These peasants operated outside of 
any institutional control.  Those who supported their movement did so as they had nothing to 
lose. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia also realized that they had more to gain than 
to lose from becoming involved with drug trafficking organizations.  Their ultimate strength in 
numbers, geographical location, and relative autonomy from the state allowed them to choose 
this route for their financial support.   
Additionally, later global events, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall allowed the group to 
alter its political ideology without many repercussions.  The fall of the Berlin Wall within the 
Soviet Union helped reduce the credibility of communism.  This is important because it allowed 
the group to escape having to adhere to a strict Marxist/Leninist ideology, moving towards a 
political agenda and actions that would be more practical for their success (Ortiz 2002: 135).  
They set themselves up to be able to use any means necessary to pursue their goals.    
As far as theory on the connection between drug trafficking organizations and terrorist 
organizations, the case studies of the People‟s Revolutionary Army and the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia support two different theories.  The People‟s Revolutionary Army 
supports the theory that argues that there should be no connection between the two groups.  The 
People‟s Liberation Army sought to establish a Communist state within Colombia.  As this was 
their ultimate goal, there was no necessity for the group to turn to drug trafficking organizations, 
as they did not share the same objective.  This is not to say that there was no need for financial 
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assistance from drug trafficking organizations, but the group believed that they were financially 
sound without the assistance of these organizations. 
The example of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia supports the theory that 
the relationship between drug trafficking organizations and terrorist groups is ultimately 
motivated by self-interest.  Members of both the terrorist organization and the drug trafficking 
organization see a benefit from becoming involved with one another.  The terrorist organization 
can offer the drug trafficking organization protection from the state, while the drug trafficking 
organization can provide financial support to the terrorist group.  The drug traffickers do not 
necessarily have to adhere to a united ideology, while FARC retains its communist ideology.  No 
group has to give up anything substantial in order to assist the other. 
Conclusion 
 While this paper explores the reasons why two organizations in one country chose 
different paths to development and financial support, it does not produce findings that could be 
held true for all other existing terrorist organizations.  It does, however highlight factors that 
could be looked at while doing a quantitative analysis of groups of terrorist organizations that 
drug traffic and groups of terrorist organizations that do not participate in the drug trade. This 
descriptive analysis presents a theory that could apply to terrorist organizations that developed 
within the borders of Colombia.  A quantitative analysis would allow for this study to not be so 
geographically isolated, thus allowing for a theory that could apply more broadly to all terrorist 
organizations.  A study done quantitatively, however, would have to acknowledge that any 
generalizations made would have to be broad because as Wardlaw notes, the relationship 
between each terrorist organization and drug trafficking organization is unique. 
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 Additionally, the inclusion of more terrorist organizations would allow for me to better 
evaluate the nature of the relationship between drug trafficking organizations and terrorist 
groups.  As this study stands, it shows that there are two plausible theories, but no theory is 
stronger than the other.  Including more terrorist organizations in a study looking at the 
relationship between drugs and terrorism would ultimately show that although there are many 
theories to explain the connection between the two, there is most likely one theory that is the 
strongest when it comes to explaining the nature of the connection.   
 While this study does make some strides to determine why some organizations traffic, 
while others do not, it can be expanded further.  Further research would create a general theory 
that could be applied to all terrorist organizations.  These case studies, however, are important 
because they allow for a deeper understanding of the development of both groups, thus allowing 
for me to be able to pinpoint differences that can be later examined in another study.       
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